In this paper, I would like to propose an idea of semantics for discourse and pictorial representations. The central notion of this paper is function. A representation is a representation of something. A function determines the connection between representation and what is represented. This is true for both discourse and pictorial representations. To properly interpret a representation system means to find an intended function that connects representation and what is represented. By combining different semantic functions, we can express complex semantic relations. In the first part of this paper, I will present a general semantic theory; in the second part, this theory will be applied to several examples.
1. THEORY
Standard semantics
A standard semantics gives the meaning of a sentence by giving its truth condition. I modify the standard definition of interpretation slightly.
(1) Definition of interpretation function a) If c is a term, then 1(c) is an element of a universe U, i.e. I(c)E U. b) If. R is a n-place relation symbol, then 1(R) is a n-place relation based on U, i.e. I(R) c Ux...xU. c) An interpretation function I* is a x-variant of 1 iff (if and only if) I* is at most different from in the interpretation of x.
d) 1(R(c l , ca)) = truth if (1(c1 ), 1(cn)) E 1(R).
e) = truth iff 1(p) = falsity. l(p A q) = truth iff 1(p) = truth and 1(q) = truth. g) 1(3x p(x)) = truth iff there is a x-variant I* of 1 such that I*(p(x)) = truth.
An interpretation function I for a first order language L is a function that satisfies the above conditions. It is a function that correlates well-formed expressions in L with objects generated from U.
Discourse representation theory (DRT)
DRT organizes a discourse not as a sequence of sentences but as a structure (cf. [3] ). In DRT, a new piece of information is continuously integrated into the given discourse structure. To make DRT more flexible, I define a DRT function fin a similar way as in section 1.1.
(2) Definition of DRT-function a) A discourse representation structure (DRS) is a pair that consists of a set V of variables and a set C of conditions. b) A DRT-function f is a function that correlates well-formed expressions with objects generated from a universe A DRT-function determines extensions of all primitive symbols. This is the crucial difference to the classical definition; in the classical definition, a structure of a world is presupposed and only variables are interpreted by an assignment. A DRT-function determines not only values of variables but also a structure of a world.
A semantic theory for pictorial representations
A pictorial representation visually describes a world. Nakayama characterizes semantics of pictorial representations by using projective functions (cf. [9] ). A projective function is a function that expresses information described in a pictorial representation. An interpretation of a pictorial representation A for B is explicated as an injection from parts of A into parts of B, where it preserves the part-whole relation. This injection is called a projective function. This theory by [9] is based on a mereological theory called Natural Representation Language (NRL) that is proposed by [8] . Usual maps and sketches also contain symbolic expressions that can be easily interpreted. Interpretations of symbols are considered as constraints on proper projective functions that are intended as correct readings. [9] defines several constraints on projective functions such as standard-name, standard-attribution, 11n-contraction, proportion-preserving, [r%]-fuzzy-proportion, and so on.
As a semantic theory for maps, Pratt's proposal is well known. He attempts to define semantics for maps under the influence of traditional truth conditional semantics (cf. [10] ). However, it is odd to speak of the truth of maps. Normally, we ask only whether a map is appropriate for a certain use. There are also different methods for the projection of the reality. The answer for the question, which projection should be used for a map, depends on its intended use. Exact projection is not always needed and in some cases not desirable, because readability is sometimes more preferable than exactness (cf. [1] ). For pictorial representations, it is crucial to know what kind of projective functions are connected with them.
Fundamental operations
So far, we have discussed how to express semantic information by a function. Now, we would like to consider the problem how to combine different information. Combination of semantic information can be expressed by combining semantic functions. As fundamental operators, I propose unification and composition; extension can be defined as certain unification. Thus, h has to verify not only K1 but also K0. In this case, h is an extension off, because it holds: h = An interpretation of sentences needs not start from the beginning; we may also start our interpretation from common background knowledge. The verifier f delivers such a starting point to interpret the assertion. Let us consider the following example.
(4) "Ivan has stopped beating his wife" presupposes that Ivan has beaten his wife. 
verifies K1 , h(x l ) = f(u 1 ), h(x2) = f(u2), and h(x3) = f(u3).
Often, presuppositions are related to certain objects. When the discourse referent x1 in K1 presupposes characterizations of u 1 given by K0, we should accept f(x1 ) = g(u 1 ) as a constraint. An external anchor in DRT connects a direct referential expression with a referent. When a speaker, pointing at Peter, says, "The man is a spy", the expression "the man" refers to Peter. This situation can be described as follows:
Then, an intended DRT-function for K1 is a DRT-function h such that fch and h verifies f corresponds to an external anchor in DRT.
Presuppositions and external and internal anchors are constraints on intended DRT-functions; these constraints are not explicitly expressed by statements. Usually, the hearer has to guess these constraints by using cues given in the context. In many cases, the hearer has to find the intended referents and the intended situation.
Combining discourse and pictorial representations
To explain a location of an object, we sometimes use a pictorial representation such as a map or a sketch and give additional information verbally. (7), and g be a DRT-function from components of K into M. Then, h = [fi u f2u is a function that unifies information from these three sources. From the map, we can get spatial information such as orientation and distance, when it is proportion-preserving. From the picture, the shape of the church can be seen. The following is a detailed formal description of this situation:
, g(x7) = Picture B, and d3 is associated with the icon t. To connect information from these three sources, we pose the following constraints:
, and f2(c2) = g(x5)• Verbal and pictorial information can be unified by using a function that combines both.
Combination of several evaluations
Fauconnier proposes a theory of mental spaces and shows how to generally interpret complicated expressions in a natural language (cf. [2] ). In this section, I will demonstrate how to deal with his complicated examples. Many examples in [2] are related to different evaluation areas; this is why he uses mental spaces. Example (9) can be considered as an ellipsis of (9') and (9') can be analyzed as (9"): To describe the meaning of (9), we can use functions, f and g, with the following properties: (10) f is an interpretation function of the actual world and g is an interpretation function of a possible world described by Len's painting. Furthermore:
(have blue eyes), and f(di ) E g(have green eyes).
Len's picture describes a possible world. This is the reason why the girl can have green eyes. She has blue eyes in the actual world but has green eyes in the world described by Len's picture. These examples show that many uses of mental spaces can be reinterpreted as marks of ranges of interpretation functions; they mark the world with respect to which an expression should be evaluated.
Requirement of an appropriate interpretation
The following example cannot be explained by the method proposed in the former section:
(12) Plato is on the top shelf. It is bound in leather. He is a very interesting author.
In (12), "Plato" stands both for a philosopher and for a book that he wrote. In this case, we need a new interpretation of "Plato". The truth condition of (12) can be described as follows:
(13) Let f be an interpretation function of the actual world and g be a function that is created in order to properly interpret (12) . Then, the meaning of (12) can be given as follows:
g(Plato) E f(book), (f(Plato), g(Plato)) E f(wrote), g(Plato) E f(on the top shelf), f(it) E f(bound in leather), f(it) = g(Plato), f(he) E f(very interesting author), and f(he) = f(Plato).
The condition, (f(Plato), g(Plato)) E f(wrote), connects two different interpretations of the name "Plato". Also in the example "The mushroom omelet paid only for himself', it holds (f(omelet), g(omelet)) E f(eaten). In many of Fauconnier's examples, we can find the connection that can be expressed in form (f(c), g(c)) E f(R), where R expresses a popular relation. In his notions, f(c) is a trigger and g(c) is a target; a connector is a function F such that g(c) = F(f(c)).
Metaphor
Metaphors can be described by using functions. For example, to understand the statement "Anger is fire", you would try to find an interpretation function g such that f(anger) c g(fire) and f(fire) c g(fire), where f is a standard interpretation function. In this case, it holds: f(anger)uf(fire) c g(fire). Certain common properties between anger and fire are properties that the speaker wanted to point out as properties of anger. The hearer has to use his imagination to find out what these common properties are.
Lakoff and Johnson distinguish target and source category (cf. [5] ). In the metaphor "Time is money", money is the source category and time is the target category. We obtain: f(money)uf(time) c g(money).
Generally, when we have f(A)uf(B) c g(A)
, then A is the source category and B is the target category, where f is a standard interpretation function.
However, not every metaphor has the form "A is B" with common nouns "A" and "B". In the example "Jeremy is a lion", "Jeremy" refers to an object and does not express any concept. Generally, to understand a metaphor, we replace the standard interpretation of A by a weaker interpretation of A, so that the statement becomes true. As a result, metaphors are open to a number of different interpretations; there is rarely one correct meaning. Sperber and Wilson claim that there is no discontinuity between loose talk and metaphor (cf. [11] ). Indeed, definition (14) is also applicable to loose talk, as the following consideration shows. 
Conditionals
In DRT, the conditional sentence, "If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it", is expressed as K1 K2, where K1 = ({x1 , x2 }, tfarmer(x i ), donkey(x2), x1 owns x2 }) and K2 = ({x3 , x4 , = x4 = x3 beats x4}).
According to (2d), a DRT-function f verifies K1 K2 if for every f s extension g that verifies K1, there is g's extension h that verifies K2 . In the classical DRT, it is not possible to interpret counterfactual conditionals. This is because any extension of f falsifies K1 , whereas we are interested in the worlds in which K1 is true. Through a use of DRT-functions, a description of meaning of counterfactuals becomes possible. Definition (17) describes truth conditions for conditionals; we presuppose here the meaning of "differs minimally from". Gardenfors' notion of revision provides an interesting explication of minimal difference (cf. [3] The both statements might be accepted as reasonable. According to Fauconnier, these examples demonstrate that it has no sense to ask after the absolute truth of several counterfactual sentences.
However, his argument is not convincing. The vagueness of the antecedents of these sentences is the true source of confusions. The following disambiguation of the antecedents shows that the speaker states two different antecedents.
(20) Disambiguation of (19) a) If Napoleon had been the son of Alexander and had lived before Christ, he would have been Macedonian. b) If Napoleon had been the son of Alexander and had inherited all good properties of Alexander, he would have won the battle.
Summary
In application examples, we had two types of treatments. We needed a combination of several functions or a slight modification of a standard interpretation. Interpretation is a creative activity based on knowledge of meaning and the world. In DRT, interpretations of variables are modifiable, but this modification is often too weak to describe complex semantic phenomena. I proposed in this paper to make interpretations of any symbols modifiable. The proposed general semantic theory is applicable to many problems and it is still strictly formal.
CONCLUSIONS
We can speak about the reality through different representation systems. We need, therefore, a semantic theory that can unify different forms of representations. Extending an idea in [7] , I proposed in this paper a general semantic theory based on a flexible treatment of functions. It has been briefly shown how to deal with dynamic semantics in DRT, integration of non-literal uses of language and semantics for pictorial representations.
